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Competition Policy and Organizational Fragmentation in Health Care 
Thomas (Tim) Greaney*
Once upon a time and a very good time it was, advocates for market based approaches to 
health policy had a coherent story to tell.  Cost and quality would remain suboptimal as long as 
fee for service medicine persisted and the myriad market imperfections that impede efficiency 
went unchecked.  Things could be righted however by adopting principles associated with 
managed care together with pursuing sensible antitrust enforcement and government 
deregulation to clear away the private and regulatory underbrush obstructing market forces.  
Economic theorists and policy experts agreed that these steps would effectively address 
information, agency, and moral hazard problems and begin to glue together the pieces of our 
fragmented delivery system.  And, for a while, things seemed to work out as promised.  
Providers began to reorganize into firms and other integrating arrangements and health insurers 
adopted financial and contractual measures designed to align provider incentives with consumer 
needs. Regulators directed policies at removing obstacles to competition and antitrust enforcers 
sought to encourage efficient consolidation while blocking cartels and provider oligopolies. 
Spiraling costs leveled off for a while and both payment systems and provider organizations 
began to adapt to market forces.   
But things changed.  A powerful backlash against managed care (precipitated in part by 
insurers’ short-sighted and sometimes abusive tactics) gave rise to regulations that undermined 
some of the methods managed care had used effectively while payors voluntarily withdrew from 
active involvement in care management. Managed care and the competition-enhancing practices 
it had begun to spawn -- integration and rivalry-- unraveled.   Several important lessons for 
competition policy emerge from the demise of the managed care era.  First, a number of factors 
deeply embedded in the nation’s health care apparatus encouraged resistance to competition. 
Even during the heyday of antitrust enforcement and market-favoring policies, many institutions 
and organizational structures changed little, as social norms and market imperfections proved to 
be powerful counterweights to conventional market incentives. In addition, many statutes, 
judicial decisions, and governmental financing programs operated at cross purposes with the 
goals of competition policy. Nor are things likely to improve soon. Today’s emerging market-
oriented paradigm, “consumer directed health care” --which requires consumers to shoulder 
responsibility for making comparisons on the price, intensity and quality of services they 
receive—threatens to increase fragmentation and does little to address the underlying 
imperfections of health care markets.  
A central challenge for all health care reform proposals currently being discussed is 
finding the means to effectively channel market forces given many deeply embedded features of 
our system and the peculiar economics of health care delivery and financing.  This essay traces 
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the path of competition law in health care and explains its chicken-and-egg relationship with 
provider organizational arrangements. It explores a central puzzle for future health care policy: 
why have market forces failed to counteract organizational fragmentation? Answering this 
question requires an understanding of why competition policy is inexorably linked to the 
organizational structures of health care providers and payers and how that the fragmentation that 
bedevils those arrangements has undermined its success. The article concludes with a negative 
assessment of recent “consumer directed” approaches, finding them likely to increase 
fragmentation and incapable of delivering the benefits of competition. 
How Competition Policy Tried To Deal with Fragmentation and Why it Failed 
Antitrust Law’s Two-Pronged Approach 
Historically, much of what can be broadly classified as “competition policy” in health 
care is found in the application of antitrust principles to the conduct and structure of provider and 
payor organizations rather than in any sweeping statutory enactments. While some landmark 
legislation, such as the repeal of health planning statutes and adoption of the 1973 HMO law,1
ERISA,2 and laws facilitating competitive contracting  through preferred provider organizations 
and in federal and state-funded health programs,3 removed some important barriers to the growth 
of managed care,  the task of dealing with unacceptable practices and problematic market 
structures was left to antitrust law.    
For some thirty years, federal and state antitrust enforcement agencies (the Federal Trade 
Commission, the United States Department of Justice and state attorneys general) have employed 
antitrust law to promote competition in health care.  The battle has been fought on two fronts.  
First, applying standard principles of industrial organization economics, the agencies have 
devoted enormous resources to challenging cartels, professional restraints, mergers and 
anticompetitive joint ventures in hospital, physician, pharmaceutical, and managed care sectors.  
Second, and less widely recognized, the agencies have engaged in extensive quasi-administrative 
efforts to encourage development of payment methods and organizations conducive to 
competition and efficiency.  The latter, which has taken the form of advisory opinions, consent 
decrees, speeches, advice to legislatures, and statements of enforcement policy, has engendered 
controversy.4 In litigation, the government's focus sometimes turned to engineering complex, 
1 Health Maintenance Organization Act of  1973, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300e-300e-17 (1994). The HMO Act established a 
federal qualifying system that provided seed money for new HMOs, required employers to offer an HMO option if 
the employer provided traditional indemnity coverage to its employees, and pre-empted state laws and policies that 
inhibited HMO formation.
2 Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified as 
amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (2000)).
3 See RAND CORPORATION, STATE LAWS AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING PREFERRED PROVIDER ORGANIZATIONS 
28-9 (1986)(describing early legislative attempts to encourage competition by removing obstacles to competitive 
contracting). 
4 See Thomas E. Kauper, The Justice Department and the Antitrust Laws: Law Enforcer or Regulator? 35 Antitrust 
Bull. 83 (1990); Thomas L. Greaney, Regulating for Efficiency in Health Care Through the Antitrust Laws, 1995 
Utah L. Rev. 465;  E. Thomas Sullivan, The Antitrust Division as a Regulatory Agency: Antitrust Policy in 
Transition, 64 Wash U.Q. 997 (1986); Jon Leibowitz, Commissioner, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Health Care and the 
FTC: The Agency as Prosecutor and Policy Wonk, Remarks at the Antitrust in HealthCare Conference of the 
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conduct-oriented settlements rather than seeking structural or criminal remedies. In issuing 
policy statements or advisory opinions the agencies have not hesitated to stress the desirability of 
preferred organizational forms, notably fully integrated, risk sharing arrangements.5  Antitrust 
enforcers have also tried to clear the way for joint ventures in purchasing, sharing information 
and other forms of cooperation. For example, the joint FTC/DOJ Policy Statements issued in 
1994 in part to bolster support for the Clinton health reforms, provided extensive guidance 
including “safety zones” that provided assurance that antitrust enforcement would not interfere 
with restructuring undertaken to respond to the evolving competitive environment.6
Taken together, these efforts had a distinctly regulatory flavor, as the guidance provided 
often extended beyond generalities about enforcement priorities or assessments of the proper 
construction of precedent. In the case of physician networks, for example, the guidance regularly 
commended specific contractual arrangements and network operations that are likely to satisfy 
the agencies' interpretation of antitrust law.7 While prescriptive regulation and antitrust 
enforcement are usually seen as incompatible, in this case they were not. As argued below, the 
agencies’ approach was been driven by an economically-sound focus on mitigating market 
failure and was a necessary ingredient of sound competition policy. 
Efforts to limit cartelization and provider monopolies in health care have been a staple of 
antitrust enforcement for almost thirty years. Following the Supreme Court’s landmark decision 
in Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar,8 the Federal Trade Commission and Department of Justice 
embarked on a series of challenges to professional restraints of trade including ethical codes 
prohibiting advertising, contracting and affiliation with HMOs, and affiliation with alternative 
care providers. Since then, Federal and state enforcers also prosecuted nearly one hundred cases 
involving price fixing cartels, physician boycotts that sought to deter innovative financing plans 
or block competition from alternative care providers, or organize collective bidding.9  Over the 
years, physician groups and associations have attempted to justify collective action on the basis 
of preserving professional sovereignty, “leveling the playing field” vis a vis insurers, assuring 
that efficient integration can take place, and protecting patients from low quality care. 10 On 
American Bar Association/American Health Lawyers Association (May 12, 2005), available at http:// 
www.ftc.gov/speeches/leibowitz/050512healthcare.pdf
5 See e.g.,  J. Thomas Rosch, Commissioner, Federal Trade Commission, Clinical Integration in Antitrust: Prospects 
for the Future (Sept. 27, 2007) available at www.ftc.gov/speeches/rosch/070917clinic.pdf.  See generally, Lawrence 
Casalino, The Federal Trade Commission, Clinical Integration, and the Organization of Physician Networks, 31 J. 
Health Pol., Pol’y & L. 569 (2004).   
6 See Thomas L. Greaney, The Department of Justice/FTC Health Care Policy Statements:  A Critique, 8 Antitrust 
20 (Spring 1994). 
7 See Clark C. Havighurst, Are the Antitrust Agencies Overregulating Physician Networks?, 8 LOY. CONSUMER 
L. REP. 78, 93 (1996) (contending that antitrust enforcers inappropriately favored financial risk sharing). See also, 
Lawrence Casalino, The Federal Trade Commission, Clinical Integration, and the Organization of Physician 
Practice, 31 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 569 (2006). 
8 421 U.S. 773 (1975). 
9 See, e.g., Am. Med. Ass’n, 94 F.T.C. 701 (1979), aff’d as modified, 638 F.2d 443 (2nd Cir. 1980), aff’d by equally 
divided Court, 452 U.S. 676 (1982); U.S. v. N.D. Hosp. Ass’n, 640 F. Supp. 1028 (D.N.D. 1986); Mich. State Med. 
Soc’y, 101 F.T.C. 191 (1983). See generally B. FURROW, ET AL., HEALTH LAW §14-10 (2000). See generally, 
Thomas L. Greaney, Whither Antitrust? The Uncertain Future of Competition Policy in Health Care, 21 Health 
Affs. 185 (March/April 2002) 
10 Remarks by Robert Pitofsky, Chairman, Federal Trade Commission,  Thoughts on “Leveling the Playing Field in 
Health Care” (Feb 13, 1997), available at: http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/pitofsky/nhla.shtm. 
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closer inspection (by the antitrust agencies, courts, and Congress) these explanations have been 
found wanting.  Even where legitimate concerns are raised, the mechanism sought—collective 
bargaining—was designed to shield physicians from market discipline with no guarantee that the 
promised benefits to the consumer would be realized. Where plausible economic arguments 
supported factoring into the analysis other market conditions, such as quality of care, imperfect 
information or the charitable mission of nonprofit hospitals, antitrust law turned a deaf ear.11
Prompted by both pragmatic considerations and suggestive legal precedent, enforcers used 
standard microeconomic analysis, framing health care as functioning “like any other industry.”   
It should be noted that antitrust enforcement has been directed, with varying degrees of intensity 
(and only mixed success), at other sectors of the health care market. For example enforcers have 
focused only sporadic efforts on dealing with problems in “upstream” markets, such as device 
and ancillary equipment suppliers.12   In other areas aggressive enforcement has met with 
resistance from the courts. The FTC has devoted extensive resources in the past five years to 
dealing with abuses of intellectual property in the pharmaceutical industry, challenging 
agreements that kept generic drugs from entering the markets of brand name rivals and mergers 
and abuses of the patent system designed to improperly obtain or maintain monopoly power.13
Despite the fact that reverse payment settlements and certain abuses of the patent system have 
enabled manufacturers of branded pharmaceuticals to reap extraordinary monopoly rents, courts 
have excused them, based on a  presumption of validity in demonstrating the agreements 
reasonableness.14  Finally, in several important areas, such as anticompetitive exclusion by group 
purchasing organizations and pharmaceutical benefit managers, in which conflicts of interest 
may cause serious impediments to market entry and innovation, governmental antitrust enforcers 
have been relatively quiescent.15
Provider market structure has also been a key target of antitrust enforcement efforts. 
Federal and state enforcers have litigated over thirty hospital merger cases and dozens more have 
been settled or abandoned. On a much smaller scale, anticompetitive linkages between hospitals 
and physicians in physician hospital organizations have occasionally been challenged16 and a 
11 See Willliam Sage & Peter Hammer, Antitrust Law, Healthcare Quality and the Courts,  102 Colum. L. Review 
545 (2002); Thomas L. Greaney, Antitrust and Hospital Mergers: Does the Nonprofit Form Affect Competitive 
Substance? 31 J. Health Pol. Pol’y & L. 511 (2006). 
12 The FTC Competition Enforcement Database lists only five actions, all involving mergers, involving medical 
devices since 2004. http://www.ftc.gov/bc/caselist/industry/cases/healthcare/HealthCareMedicalEquipment.pdf 
13 See, e.g.  Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056 (11th Cir. 2005). The “reverse payments” cases have 
generated an enormous literature debating a host of economic and doctrinal issues. See e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp, 
Mark Janis & Mark A. Lemley, Anticompetitive Settlement of Intellectual Property Disputes, 87 Minn. L. Rev. 
1719, 1720-21 (2003); Carl Shapiro, Antitrust Limits to Patent Settlements, 34 RAND J. Econ. 391, 391 (2003);
James Langenfeld & Wenqing Li, Intellectual Property and Agreements to Settle Patent Disputes: The Case of 
Settlement Agreements with Payments from Branded to Generic Drug Manufacturers, 70 Antitrust L.J. 777 (2003). 
14 Prepared Statement Of The Federal Trade Commission Before The Subcommittee On Commerce, Trade, And 
Consumer Protection Committee On Energy And Commerce United States House Of Representatives On “How 
Pay-For-Delay Settlements Make Consumers And The Federal Government Pay More For Much Needed DrugS” 
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2009/03/P859910payfordelay.pdf . 
15 See Letter from Senator Mark Montigny to FTC Chairman Deborah Platt Majoras, May 11, 2005 (letter from 
bipartisan group of state legislators urging investigation of PBM industry, noting that “numerous states are devoting 
considerable enforcement resources to combating fraudulent and anticompetitive conduct by PBMs”).  
16 See e.g., U.S. v. HealthCare Partners, Inc., 1996-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶71337, 1996 WL 193753 (D. Conn. 1996)
(consent decree)(settling claims that PHO’s overinclusive panel of physicians would foreclose competition).
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few anticompetitive hospital networks17 have come under scrutiny. These cases were consistent 
with the view that the success of managed care competition hinged on the preservation of 
competitive providers markets.  The theme of encouraging  market structures in which managed 
care entities could successfully “play providers off against each other” through competitive 
bidding or negotiations was the hallmark of the federal antitrust strategy.  At the same time, 
antitrust enforcers were relatively passive with regard to vertical combinations and managed care 
mergers.  While a handful of cases were brought challenging monopsonistic (“buy side”) abuses 
or  monopoly-preserving (“sell-side”) conduct by large health insurers and a few mergers 
involving large national firms resulted in spin offs of a handful of contracts, little attention was 
directed at managed care companies.18  The agencies questioned the AMA’s repeated claims that 
oligopolistic managed care markets impeded competition, concluding instead that local insurance 
markets for the most part were competitively structured and lacked significant barriers to entry.19
Although initially successful in breaking down institutional barriers to competition and 
challenging hospital mergers, antitrust enforcement efforts have encountered a number of 
problems over the last decade.  Most significantly, federal and state antitrust agencies 
experienced a series of seven consecutive defeats in federal court challenges to hospital 
mergers.20  As discussed below, the decisions in those cases can be faulted on a number of 
grounds: failure to incorporate a sophisticated understanding of the market imperfection of health 
care markets, poor case selection by the government, and to some extend a judicial backlash 
against managed care.  However, the government’s spotty record in litigation may be offset to 
some extent by its extensive efforts to secure voluntary compliance with the law and adoption of 
organizational structures that do not directly impede competition. 
17 See Letter from David R. Pender, Acting Assistant Director, Bureau of Competition, FTC, to Clifton E. Johnson 
(Mar. 28, 2006) (FTC Staff Advisory Opinion)(unfavorable advisory opinion involving “super PHO” consisting of 
eight hospitals).
18 See United States v. UnitedHealth Group Inc., Case No. 05CV02436 (D.D.C. 2006) (merger of UnitedHealth 
Group Inc. and PacifiCare Health Systems, Inc.) and United States v. UnitedHealth Group Inc., Case No. 08-cv-
00322 (D.D.C. 2008) (merger of UnitedHealth Group Inc. and Sierra Health Services, Inc.). Recently, in reviewing 
the proposed merger of Highmark Inc. and Independence Blue Cross found significant competitive issues (despite 
the fact that the U.S. Department of Justice had not objected to the merger) and imposed preconditions that led to the 
parties abandoning the merger. Two Pennsylvania Blue Cross Plans Abandon Two-Year Effort to Consolidate, 
Health L. Rep (BNA)(Jan. 19, 2009), 
http://news.bna.com/hlln/HLLNWB/split_display.adp?fedfid=11391585&vname=hlrnotallissues&wsn=499439500
&searchid=7363376&doctypeid=1&type=date&mode=doc&split=0&scm=HLLNWB&pg=0 
19 See Federal Trade Commission & U.S. Dept. of Justice, IMPROVING HEALTH CARE: A DOSE OF COMPETITION at 
Ch. 6;  see also,  David A. Hyman and William E. Kovacic Monopoly, Monopsony, And Market Definition: An 
Antitrust Perspective On Market Concentration Among Health Insurers, 23 Health Affs. 25, 27 (2004)(summarizing 
report as concluding that employers find most insurance markets enjoy “healthy competition”  and that “most 
employers can self-insure and thereby avoid most of the problems that might otherwise result from health insurance 
market concentration”). 
20 See Thomas L. Greaney, Chicago’s Procrustean Bed: Applying Antitrust in Health Care, 71 Antitrust L.J.857 
(2004).  Seeking to right their ship, the FTC challenged an already-consummated merger involving two nonprofit 
hospitals in Evanston Illinois.  In the Matter of Evanston Northwestern Hospital, FTC Docket No. 9315 (Aug. 6, 
2007) available at www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9315/070806opinion.pdf. After finding the acquistion violated the 
Clayton Act,  the Commission declined to require structural relief,  instead ordering  that the merged hospitals form 
separate and independent negotiating teams to contract with managed care organizations.  
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The second prong of antitrust enforcement sought to focus the agencies’ enforcement 
apparatus on creating an environment conducive to managed care competition.  The “apparatus” 
referred to here is a variety of formal and informal tools used by the agencies outside the narrow 
bounds of prosecuting antitrust abuses in judicial and administrative hearings.  It includes 
settlements and consent decrees, speeches, advisory opinions, advice to legislators, and policy 
statements.21  Because they encourage adoption of structures and arrangements that avoid 
antitrust risk, these tools have a distinctly prescriptive flavor.   While these undertakings 
controversially enmeshed the agencies in “regulation” (as opposed to seeking remedies by 
adjudication litigation), they also afforded an opportunity to direct providers and payors toward 
economically sound arrangements given the peculiarities of health care markets.  
In pursing these undertakings, countering fragmentation was a prominent objective of the 
government’s subterranean regulatory agenda.  Dispensing advice and negotiating settlements 
the agencies stressed the desirability of integrating independent providers.  It afforded safe 
harbor treatment for financial risk sharing in its policy statements, and repeatedly signaled in 
speeches and advisory opinions that it strongly favored integration via risk sharing or formation 
of fully integrated firms and partnerships.22 In eventually countenancing “clinical integration” as 
an alternative form of cooperation that could avoid summary condemnation, the agencies took 
pains to stipulate detailed conditions evidencing the sufficiency of integration and the necessity 
for price agreements.23
Though criticized as overly prescriptive, 24 the agencies’ insistence on specific 
integrative activities was entirely appropriate in view of the market imperfections that plague the 
industry. Risk-sharing mechanisms, especially capitation and fee withholds, counteract the 
incentives of compensation systems to over-provide medical care.  Where there is only token 
commitment to the cooperative enterprise (such as physicians ownership in a thinly capitalized 
network), incentives are lacking to counter the fee for service hydraulic for costly and excessive 
care. As Peter Hammer summarized the prevailing incentive structure, “[unintegrated] networks 
can be expected to maximize profits both by using whatever market power they possess to 
charge higher prices and by practicing medicine using traditional standards which are 
21 See Greaney, Regulating for Efficiency in Health Care, supra.; See also Deborah Platt Majoras, Chairman, 
FTC, Remarks at the World Congress Leadership Summit: The Federal Trade Commission: Fostering a 
Competitive Health Care Environment That Benefits Patients (Feb. 28, 2005), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/majoras/050301healthcare.pdf: 
[L]aw enforcement is not the only procedure we use to cure anticompetitive ailments.  The FTC 
actively engages in advocacy before states and other federal Agencies, urging the adoption of pro 
competitive strategies for improving health care quality and bringing costs down.…[A]dvocacy can be 
very effective.  Competition advocacy…can prevent legislation that might unintentionally injure 
competition—and raise patients’ costs—from getting on the books in the first place. 
22 See e.g., Letter from Jeffrey W. Brennan, Assistant Dir., Bureau of Competition, FTC, to Martin J. Thompson 
(Sept. 23, 2003) (Staff Advisory Opinion to Bay Area Preferred Physicians) [BAPP Advisory Opinion]; Letter from 
Jeffrey W. Brennan, Assistant Dir., Bureau of Competition, FTC, to Gregory G. Binford (Feb. 6, 2003) (Staff 
Advisory Opinion to PriMed Physicians). 
23 Letter from Jeffrey W. Brennan, Assistant Dir., Bureau of Competition, FTC, to John J. Miles (Feb. 19, 2002) 
(Staff Advisory Opinion to MedSouth, Inc.) [ MedSouth Advisory Opinion].  See also, Remarks of J. Thomas 
Rosch, Commissioner, Federal Trade Commission, Clinical Integration in Antitrust: Prospects for the Future (Sept. 
27, 2007) available at www.ftc.gov/speeches/rosch/070917clinic.pdf 
24 Clark C. Havighurst, Are the Antitrust Agencies Overregulating Physician Networks? 8 Loy. Cons.L. Rep.78 
(1995-96). 
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intrinsically biased in favor of over providing care."25 Thus antitrust policy sensibly targeted 
fragmented delivery arrangements and encouraged integration. However for reasons discussed in 
the next section, neither the nudge of law enforcement nor the pressure of managed care 
bargaining proved sufficient to unseat entrenched provider arrangements.  
Antitrust as a (Mostly Unsuccessful) Antidote to Fragmentation 
Superficially viewed, the antitrust agenda might seem to increase fragmentation as it 
prevents aggregation of providers into large entities or cooperation through alliances with 
competitors.  However, economic theory predicts the opposite result. A central (some say 
exclusive) objective of antitrust is fostering efficiency. Hence antitrust doctrine promotes 
efficiency-enhancing integration, including mergers, joint ventures and other forms of 
cooperation, between rivals and between entities in vertical relationships.  Indeed, theory and 
experience teach that competitive markets should act to stimulate inter-firm cooperation through 
organizational structures and encourage agreements that improve performance and lower costs. 
Properly applied, then,  antitrust law should both promote decentralized decision making by 
market participants, while encouraging efficient combinations that serve consumer welfare.   
Yet, in health care this rosy scenario has not come to pass, as antitrust enforcement had at 
best only modest success in encouraging efficient consolidation of providers. The disparity 
between the predictions of conventional microeconomics and marketplace experience exposes 
the power of what Arrow termed nonmarket forces in health care.26 Multiple factors contributed 
but it seems clear that the deeply entrenched norms, institutional structures and legal regimes that 
have long supported fragmentation enabled providers to resist change.  As a result, innovations 
in care delivery, organization, and financing that competition theorists thought inevitable did not 
spread. Providers remained content to practice in silos, though some sectors such as hospitals and 
certain physician specialties, formed local monopolies or oligopolies to further insulate 
themselves from rivalry. Legal and regulatory factors also play a part in determining the path of 
markets. As discussed below, questionable holdings in key cases and conflicting signals from 
other legal regimes legitimated these arrangements and ultimately the antitrust agenda did not 
generate the integrated systems or virtual networks needed for competition to have any serious 
bite. 
Fragmentation at the provider level frustrated competition policy in a number of ways.  
For the large percentage of physicians practicing in small groups or single specialty practices, 
adapting to managed care’s incentives for risk sharing and economizing practices was 
extraordinarily difficult.27  Many physicians proved inept in assessing risk and when dealing 
with capitation were subject to problems flaws of overoptimism and other biases identified by 
behavioral decision theorists.  At the same time, physicians jealously guarded their independence 
and were resistant to undertaking employment relationships or joining staff model HMOs or 
large practice groups.  In the dozens of cases described earlier, groups of physicians formed 
25 Peter J. Hammer, Medical Antitrust Reform: Arrow, Coase, and the Changing Structure of the Firm, in THE 
PRIVATIZATION OF HEALTH CARE REFORM 113, 115-16 (M. Gregg Bloche ed., 2003).  See also Rosch 
supra note xx (“financial incentives are safest way to proceed” given uncertainties about the incentives and 
implementation of clinical integration). 
26 Kenneth J. Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care, 53 Am. Econ. Rev. 941 (1963).
27 See infra notes xx and accompanying text. 
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thinly-disguised cartels to gain market power to bargain with managed care companies.  
Elsewhere, physicians flocked to loosely structured PPOs that did little to promote price 
competition or instill incentives to change practice styles.28 Further, the absence of vertical 
integration also frustrated managed care’s performance.  In hospital markets, in which most 
patients delegate hospital choice to their physicians, who do not internalize the costs of 
technology or excess capacity, hospitals benefited more by competing for physician affiliation 
(though various forms of nonprice competition) than by economizing for the benefit of 
contracting.  The net result was proliferation of  “networks” that did little to change practice 
patterns and entrenchment of market structures that served as bulwarks against effective 
bargaining by managed care organizations. 
Fragmentation arising out of health care financing exacerbated these problems and served 
to undermine managed care’s incentives to promote development of efficient delivery 
organizations.  With physicians typically contracting with multiple payors, incentives to change 
practice styles or adopt other methods for controlling cost or improving quality to conform to 
protocols of any single payor are attenuated. In addition, fee for service payment neglects many 
of the services key to developing integrated approaches to delivery. For example it fails to pay 
for care coordination and information exchanges and undervalues other valuable services such as 
cognitive services and communications outside care encounters.  Given dominant payment 
methodologies rewarding physicians who do not integrate their practice arrangements, and 
organized medicine’s longstanding resistance to organizational hierarchies, it is not altogether 
surprising that managed care’s competitive incentives failed to deliver change.  
The antitrust agenda also encountered serious litigation setbacks, as courts rejected a 
succession of FTC and Department of Justice challenges to hospital mergers and enforcers 
subsequently backed off monitoring the hospital sector.  As discussed in the following section, 
local hospital markets around the country became highly concentrated. Paradoxically, this 
consolidation also served to reinforce health sector fragmentation.  It did so by strengthening 
hospitals’ market power and hence their ability to resist managed care demands for economizing 
practices, such as forming integrated delivery system with physicians.  Underlying these judicial 
decisions is the persistent failure to adapt legal analyses to the peculiar economics of competition 
in the health care sector.  The principal shortcoming was the courts’ tendency to oversimplify 
antitrust analysis by adopting plain vanilla, Chicago school assumptions about markets while 
failing to incorporate the effects of market imperfections in their analyses of health markets.29 As 
a result, most of these hospital merger decisions found extraordinarily large geographic markets 
for basic acute care hospital services by failing to appreciate the heterogeneity of demand for 
care and the fact that consumers exhibit different preferences for travel.  Other cases refused to 
recognize supply side heterogeneity, failing to appreciate that mergers of “must have” hospitals 
28 Bryan E. Dowd,  Coordinated Agency Versus Autonomous Consumers in Health Care Markets, 24 Health Aff. 
1501 (Nov/Dec 2006). 
29 Thomas L. Greaney, Chicago’s Procrustean Bed: Applying Antitrust in Health Care, 71 Antitrust L.J.857 (2004). 
An emerging critique of conventional antitrust wisdom applies the teaching of behavioral economics. See Maurice 
E. Stucke, Behavioral Economics at the Gate: Antitrust in the Twenty-First Century, 38 LOY. U. CHI. L. REV. 513, 
527–28 (2007).  See generally Korobkin & Ulen, Law & Behavioral Science : Removing the Rationality Assumption 
from Law & Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051–1102 (2000); Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law & 
Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1998).  For applications in several areas of health care law see, Thomas L. 
Greaney, Economic Regulation of Physicians: A Behavioral Economics Perspective, __St. Louis U. L. J __(2009).
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may create risks of anticompetitive effects.30 Health economists and commentators have roundly 
criticized these decisions as inconsistent with the economic realities of local competition and for 
misapprehending the interplay of managed care organizations (MCOs), employers, and insured 
persons in selecting hospitals.31
Legal analyses are not immune to the biases and preconceptions prevalent in the society 
at large. In refusing to enjoin hospital mergers and rejecting other antitrust challenges to provider 
market power, courts may have internalized skepticism about health care insurers popularly 
characterized as a “managed care backlash.” Betraying a strong undercurrent of suspicion about 
the role of managed care for example, one federal Circuit decision quoted Judge Richard 
Posner's hyperbolic dictum that "the HMO's incentive is to keep you healthy if it can but if you 
get very sick, and are unlikely to recover to a healthy state involving few medical expenses, to let 
you die as quickly and cheaply as possible."32 Other courts have revealed these assumptions 
more explicitly in  holdings downplaying testimony from managed care buyers33 or suggesting 
that competition resulting from rivalry among such entities was not in consumers' interest.34
Further, one federal court and some state attorneys general accepted consent decrees allowing 
mergers to proceed subject to regulatory controls on profits, price and charitable care as a 
substitute for preserving market structures conducive to price competition.35 Thus it is possible 
to discern in the case law an implicit suspicion of the competition paradigm on which antitrust 
enforcement rested, namely vigorous bargaining by managed care organizations exerting 
pressure on providers to reorganize themselves to adopt more cost efficient arrangements. 
Another factor contributing to the failure of competitive forces to encourage de-
fragmentation of markets is the regulatory environment governing providers.  Several significant 
legal regimes directly impede efficiency-enhancing cooperation among rivals.  The federal anti-
kickback and Stark laws bar many forms of vertical and horizontal cooperation that can improve 
efficiency.36 Consequently, the fragmented community of physicians and hospitals is prevented 
from responding to competitive market incentives to integrate via joint ventures and contractual 
arrangements. Perhaps more than any other regulatory obstacle, the inability of hospitals to share 
efficiency and cost effective improvements with physicians who order services impedes effective 
deployment of health resources.37
30 United States v. Long Island Jewish Med. Ctr., 983 F. Supp. 121  (E.D.N.Y. 1997). 
31 See e.g., Kenneth L. Danger & H.E. Frech, Critical Thinking About "Critical Loss" in Antitrust, 46 ANTITRUST 
BULL. 339 (2001); James Langenfeld & Wenqing Li, Critical Loss in Evaluating Mergers, 46 Antitrust Bulletin 
299 (2001); Gregory Vistnes, Hospitals, Mergers, and Two-Stage Hospital Competition,67 Antitrust L.J. 671 
(2000).
32 Federal Trade Commission v. Tenet Health Care Corp., 186 F.3d 1045, 1054 (8th Cir. 1999)(quoting Blue Cross 
& Blue Shield United v. Marshfield Clinic, 65 F.3d 1406, 1410 (7th Cir. 1995)). 
33 Federal Trade Commission v. Tenet Health Care Corp., 186 F.3d 1045 (8th Cir. 1999). 
34 FTC v. Butterworth Health Corp., 946 F. Supp. 1285, 1299 (W.D. Mich. 1996)(questioning the benefits of 
managed care contracting and concluding that “selective price advantages are hardly the sort of benefit the antitrust 
laws are designed to protect”). 
35 FTC v. Butterworth Health Corp., 946 F. Supp. 1285, 1291 (W.D. Mich. 1996). 
36 See James Blumstein, the  Fraud and Abuse Statute in an Evolving Healthcare Marketplace: Life in the Health 
Care Speakeasy, 22 Am. J. L. & Med. 205 (1996); David Hyman, Health Care Fraud and Abuse, Social Norms, and 
“The Trust Reposed in the Workmen” J. Legal Studies 531 (2001). 
37 See Gail Wilensky, et al., Gain Sharing: A Good Concept Getting a Bad Name? 26 Health Aff. 58 (2007). 
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Another cluster of laws operate to impair the development of efficient “firms” or 
contractual arrangements that bridge traditional doctor-hospital boundaries. State certificate of 
need laws, for example, impair competition in acute care and some ambulatory services.38 These 
laws, which create barriers to entry by rivals, especially physicians seeking to open specialty 
hospitals or ambulatory surgery centers, contribute indirectly to health sector fragmentation. 
They do so by institutionalizing existing physician-hospital relationships, essentially ossifying 
traditional, autonomous roles. For example, by erecting barriers for physicians wanting to 
operate ambulatory surgical facilities or acute care specialty hospitals, these laws significantly 
reduce opportunities for integrated service delivery.  Adding to the problem is another body of 
law recognized in approximately a  dozen states, the corporate practice of medicine doctrine, 
which inhibits medical professionals from working in employment relationships and prohibits 
corporate entities from assuming responsibility for the provision of services.39  This doctrine 
prohibits (or imposes significant transaction costs on) arrangements between physicians and 
corporate entities that provide health care services. As such it operates to reduce opportunities 
establishing “firms” that can more efficiently organize care delivery. Finally, a network of other 
laws and regulations, including JCAHO certification standards40 and those governing physician 
responsibilities and rights in hospital management,41 solidify professional autonomy within 
hospitals and reinforce barriers to hospitals asserting greater control to integrate their operations 
in a cost effective manner 
The preceding catalogue of obstacles to integration should not be understood to suggest 
that competition theorists had everything right.  Indeed, the brief that competition advocates 
presented for the capacity of managed care to address market failure overlooked several 
important obstacles.42  For example, although it provided an effective mechanism for alleviating 
agency and information problems among providers, patients and payors, managed care by itself 
could not address the serious information deficits respecting quality and outcomes.  As public 
goods, such information is underproduced in the market and requires government action though 
subsidy or direct provision.43  While government policies in administering and financing public 
38 See Federal Trade Commission & U.S. Dept. of Justice, IMPROVING HEALTH CARE: A DOSE OF COMPETITION , at 
ch. 8 at 6 (summarizing evidence regarding the impact of CON laws on competition and cost control and urging 
states to reconsider whether CON laws are serving the public interest). 
39 See e.g. Berlin v. Sarah Bush Lincoln Health Center, 688 N.E. 2d 106 (Ill. 1997); see generally,  Mark A. Hall, 
Institutional Control Of Physician Behavior, 137 U. Pa. L.Rev. 431 (1988). 
40 See James Blumstein, Of Doctors and Hospitals: Setting the Analytical and Regulatory Framework for Managing 
the Relationship, 4 Ind. Health L. Rev. 211, 222-25 (2007). 
41 See John Blum, Beyond the Bylaws: Hospital-Physician Relationships, Economics. And Conflicting Agendas, 53 
Buff. L. Rev. 459 (2005);  see also  John P. Marren et al., Hospital Boards at Risk and the Need to Restructure the 
Relationship with the Medical Staff: Bylaws, Peer Review and Related Solutions, 12 ANNALS HEALTH L. 179, 207-
12 (2003). 
42 See Thomas L. Greaney, Competitive Reform in Health Care: The Vulnerable Revolution, 5 Yale. J. Reg. 179 
(1988)(predicting that competition in health care would not succeed if regulatory and infrastructure did not support 
it). 
43 Paul Ginsburg summarized the need for public and private initiatives to improve technology assessment as 
follows:   
Over the long haul, advancements in medical technology are far and away the biggest factor in rising costs.  
And our current financing system facilitates the rapid diffusion of expensive new technologies by paying 
most of their cost—even in the absence of careful consideration of their clinical effectiveness relative to 
existing treatments.  Fundamental change in this dynamic would require support for improved and more 
frequent evaluation of new technologies prior to decisions about coverage, as well as carefully 
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programs such as Medicare might have served this function, they did not.  In addition, market 
theorists generally overlooked the fact that market failure can be exacerbated or perpetuated by 
“government failure,” public policies that entrench market imperfections. To cite a few 
examples,  federal tax policy supported moral hazard in insurance; fee for service payment under 
Medicare reinforced physician agency problems and countenanced cost-ineffective practice 
styles; and licensure and accreditation imposed entry and mobility barriers on providers.  
Aftermath: Concentration and Fragmentation in a Disintermediated Market 
Following the government’s defeats in the hospital merger cases, an extraordinary 
consolidation occurred in hospital and insurance markets.  Emboldened by the results in those 
cases and the government’s ensuing reluctance to challenge mergers in court, concentration grew 
significantly in almost all sectors of health care delivery and payment.  Hundreds of hospital 
mergers occurred in the 1990s, and by 2003 ninety three percent of the nation’s population lived 
in concentrated hospital markets.44  In local acute care hospital markets the effects of 
concentration were striking.  Research demonstrates that hospital consolidation in the 1990s 
raised overall inpatient prices by at least five percent and by forty percent or more when merging 
hospitals were closely located.45  Anecdotal evidence confirms that payers in many local markets 
faced increased resistance to bargaining by hospitals and that this led to higher prices.46 Besides 
price increases owing to enhanced bargaining power, increases in hospital costs appear to be 
driven by strategic decisions that take advantage of market imperfections.  By some  accounts, 
the “medical arms race” has resurfaced, as hospitals have undertaken significant expansions in 
high margin services and accelerated technology acquisitions, in part owing to their capacity to 
induce demand following the demise of managed care.47
Consolidation in local hospital markets does not appear to have produced significant 
scale economies or other efficiencies that would benefit consumers.  The literature on 
multihospital system performance shows little evidence of improvement in cost per admission, 
profitability or service provision to the community in the form of charity.48  Likewise, hospital 
networks and alliances did not exhibit significant economies or other efficiencies.49  The 
differentiated incentives built into the financing system that encourage both providers and patients to 
evaluate the clinical effectiveness of a given course of treatment against its cost.  
Statement of Paul Ginsburg, Center for Studying Health System Change, before Subcommittee on Oversight, House 
Ways and Means Committee (June 22, 2004). 
44  Robert Woods Johnson Foundation, The Synthesis Project, How Has Hospital Consolidation Affected the Price 
and Quality of Hospital Care (Feb. 2006) at 1. 
45 See Robert Woods Johnson Foundation, The Synthesis Project, How Has Hospital Consolidation Affected the 
Price and Quality of Hospital Care (Feb. 2006)(citing simulation studies show price increases of 53 percent; event 
studies indicating 40 percent increases; and Structure-Conduct Performance studies showing 4–6 percent increases).  
See also Robert Town et al., The Welfare Consequences of Hospital Mergers (NBER 2006)(hospital mergers raised 
HMO premiums 3.2% and caused .3% decline in private insurance in 2001). 
46 See Center for Study of Health Systems Change, CTS Site Visits (periodic survey of competitive conditions in 12 
markets) http://www.hschange.com/index.cgi?data=06.  
47 See Robert A. Berenson et al., Hospital-Physician Relations: Competition, Cooperation or Separation?, Health 
Aff. Web Exclusive  (Dec. 5, 2006). 
48 See Lawton R. Burns & Mark V. Pauly, Integrated Delivery Networks: A Detour on the Road to Integrated 
Health Care?, Health Aff. (July/Aug. 2002)(summarizing studies of horizontal hospital mergers). 
49 Id. See also Bazzoli, The Financial Performance of Hospitals Belonging to Health Networks and Systems, 37 
Inquiry 234 (2000). 
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evidence on the effect of hospital mergers on quality is mixed, a recent summary of the literature 
states that “the majority of studies find that hospital mergers lower quality,” and that result is 
supported by the strongest studies.50
In sum, the extensive hospital consolidation that occurred in the 1990s cannot be 
interpreted as a welfare-improving correction to market fragmentation.  Instead, the merger wave 
is best understood as a successful effort to gain leverage in the marketplace, which hospitals used 
to deflect the price and volume discipline threatened by managed care contracting. At the same 
time, efforts at vertical integration (between hospitals and physicians and between providers and 
insurers) came to a halt. 
Competition in physician markets during the managed care era followed a completely 
different path but also failed to rationalize market structures or produce effective rivalry. As 
discussed below, physicians did not engage in widespread horizontal merger activity in the 
1990s, and although the percentage of doctors in small practices declined, this market remained 
fragmented as multi-specialty practice did not increase significantly.51  Throughout that period 
and beyond, however, physicians engaged in extensive cartelization. Between 1976 and 1996, 
the FTC and Department of Justice initiated and settled by consent decrees approximately sixty 
five enforcement actions against hospital- and physician-contracting networks for jointly 
negotiating on behalf of their members with payors in a manner that constituted unlawful 
horizontal price-fixing agreements.52 Remarkably, this vigorous record of prosecution did not 
deter the challenged conduct: since the beginning of this decade, the FTC has brought thirty-four 
such cases and the Antitrust Division of the DOJ challenged at least five similar arrangements as 
illegal horizontal restraints.   The government’s willingness to accept “wrist slap” consent 
decrees and adoption of administrative rather than prosecutorial approach to the problem helps 
explain the widespread lack of compliance with antitrust norms.53 Notably absent in the 
government’s prosecutions were criminal and structural remedies or stringent civil remedies.  
Finally, the health insurance market has undergone significant consolidation as there have 
been over 400 health insurer mergers in the past decade and virtually every major metropolitan 
market is highly concentrated.  With premiums increasing over 87 percent over the past six 
years, insurance market concentration has engendered considerable controversy.54  However, 
antitrust challenges to insurer mergers or conduct have been few and far between.  In the past 
seven years the DOJ has only required the restructuring of two proposed health insurance 
mergers, both with very modest divestitures.  In the view of the federal agencies, insurer market 
power has not been significant, owing to perceived ease of entry and self insurance alternatives 
available to large employers.  Though not expressly acknowledged, the agencies’ lenient posture 
may reflect the view that managed care serves as an important counterweight to the power of 
50 Synthesis Project at xx. See also Vivian Ho & Barton Hamilton, Hospital Mergers and Acquisitions: Does the 
Market Consolidation Harm Patients?, 19 J. Health Econ. 767 (2000). 
51 See infra note xx and accompanying text. 
52 See Thomas L. Greaney, Thirty Years of Solicitude: Antitrust and Physician Cartels, 7 Hous. J. Health L. & Pol. 
189 (2007) 
53 See Greaney, Thirty Years of Solicitude, supra.; see also Rosch, Clinical Integration, supra 
54 See Testimony of Henry S. Allen, American Medical Association, Committee on the Judiciary, United States 
Senate, Consolidation in the Pennsylvania Insurance Market: The Right Prescription? (July 31, 2008),  
http://judiciary.senate.gov/pdf/08-07-31Allen_Testimony.pdf 
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providers. In essence, then, the government may have adopted what it viewed as a second-best 
strategy under which it is hoped that bilateral monopoly will achieve some measure of benefit to 
consumers.  This view, it should be noted, is disputed by those who assert that managed care 
competition has resulted in higher prices to consumers and monopsony input pricing for 
physicians.55
Current trends in physician organization suggest that the structure of medical services 
delivery is moving in the wrong direction.  There is considerable evidence that large 
multispecialty groups offer clinically superior and seamless delivery of care and perform better 
in terms of collecting and distributing information, thereby improving quality.56 A well 
functioning financing system should encourage physicians to join such organizations in order to 
attract more patients by providing higher quality, cost effective care.  And indeed, during the 
managed care era, there was perceptible movement away from solo and small group physician 
practice, and in some markets, considerable growth among multispecialty groups. However, as 
managed care receded, specialists began to move to mid-size, single specialty groups, which 
provide less opportunity for quality improvement.  As the Center for Studying Health System 
Change has concluded, financial incentives under the evolving insurance arrangements rewarded 
migration to inefficient organizational forms. Large single-specialty groups are able to gain 
market power to negotiate higher reimbursement without suffering penalties for higher costs or 
lower quality.57 Further, these groups can assemble capital so that they can capitalize on flaws in 
the payment system, typically by moving into high reimbursement, capital intensive services and 
opportunistically engaging in self-referral where permitted under exceptions to anti-self referral 
laws.58
Changes in financing have also altered the dynamics of competition in hospital markets. 
As noted earlier, concentration in many acute care hospital markets has given hospitals leverage 
to extract monopoly rents. In addition, the overall shift to passive contracting by insurers has 
undermined efficient resource allocation in hospital markets.  As Berenson, Bodenheimer and 
Pham describe these changes:  
With the decline of risk contracting and a return to fee-for-service payment, hospitals 
were relieved of the need to manage costs for defined populations. They returned to the 
traditional business model of filling beds with well-insured patients. Faced with growing 
competition for patients, both from other hospitals and from ambulatory-based care, 
hospitals quickly adopted strategies dedicated to increasing the flow of patients into the 
55 See Testimony of David Balto, Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, Consolidation in the 
Pennsylvania Insurance Market: The Right Prescription? (July 31, 2008),  http://judiciary.senate.gov/pdf/08-07-31 
56 See  Toward of 21st Century Health System: The Contribution and Promise of Prepaid Group Practice (Alain 
Enthoven & Laura A. Tolen eds 2004); Steven Shortell et al, REMAKING HEALTH CARE IN AMERICA: BUILDING 
ORGANIZED DELIVERY SYSTEMS (1996).   
57 Hoangmai H. Pham & Paul B. Ginsburg, Unhealthy Trends: The Future of Physician Services, 26 Health Aff. 
1587 (Nov./Dec 2007). 
58 Id. 
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hospital. In short, hospitals resumed what in the 1980s [was] described as a “medical 
arms race,” a form of competition tending to increase, rather than reduce, costs.59
Further, physicians have seized upon emerging conditions to compete directly with 
hospitals, acquiring ownership interests in specialty hospitals, ambulatory surgery centers, 
diagnostic imaging facilities and other ancillary service facilities. Anecdotal evidence, including 
interviews with employers and third party payers, suggests that providers are able to exploit their 
agency relationship to induce demand and shift the locus of care to the facilities in which they 
have ownership interests.60
These developments have created new opportunities for both competition and collusion 
between hospitals and doctors.61 In some cases, hospitals have established joint ventures with 
their physicians primarily as a defensive move, while in others they have acted to counter rivals 
using techniques ranging from vigorous competition to anticompetitive exclusionary tactics. 
From the perspective of competition policy the import of emerging physician-hospital rivalry 
depends on the specifics of the markets involved.62 In some cases physician-owned entities may 
offer a valuable source of new competition in oligopolistic  hospital markets; in others the 
physicians may be externalizing costs on rival community hospitals. In the absence of a 
mediating influence of third party payers, responsibility for sorting out the pro- and anti-
competitive cases will fall on legislators, regulators or antitrust enforcers.  
Consumer Driven Health Care: A Flawed Vehicle for Change 
 The preceding analysis suggests that managed care competition did not alleviate, and indeed 
probably fell victim to, provider market fragmentation.  Over the last ten years health insurers 
have retreated from active management of care and a new market-oriented approach, “consumer 
directed health care” (CDHC), has emerged.  While that phrase covers a lot of ground, as used 
here it reflects the broad shift of responsibility for choice and cost to consumers.63  Relying 
increasingly on large co-payments, deductibles and various benefit designs, insurance plans offer 
benefits packages that create incentives for consumers to take more responsibility to choose the 
nature and intensity of health services and providers who provide that care.  Beyond the trend 
toward higher deductibles and co-payments, consumer directed plans sometimes are linked with 
health reimbursement accounts which are dedicated funds supplied by employer and/or 
59 Robert A. Berenson et al, Specialty-Service Lines: Salvos in the New Medical Arms Race, Health Aff. Web 
Exclusive (July 25, 2006) at w338.  
60 See Berenson et. al. Hospital-Physician Relations: Competition, Cooperation or Separation?, Health Aff. Web 
Exclusive  (Dec. 5, 2006) at w31.  
61 See e.g., Rome Ambulatory  Surgery Center v. Rome Memorial Hospital, 330 F.Supp 2d 389 (N.D. N.Y. 2004); 
Gordon v. Lewiston Hospital, 272 F.Supp. 2d 393 (M.D. Pa. 2003).  See also, Mahan v. Avera St. Luke’s 621 N.W. 
150 (S.D. 2000). 
62 An analysis of the underlying economic relationships suggests that in the hospital setting, staff physicians and 
hospitals provide complementary products and each side benefits from free rider benefits of its association with the 
other. See David A. Argue, An Economic Model of Competition Between General Hospitals and Physician-Owned 
Specialty Practices, 20 Antitrust Healthcare Chronicle (July 2006).  Application of antitrust principles to disputes 
involving hospitals’ reactions to specialty hospital competition needs to closely evaluate these relationships in order 
to determine whether plausible efficiencies justify challenged conduct.  
63 See Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, HEALTH CARE AT RISK: A CRITIQUE OF THE CONSUMER DRIVEN MOVEMENT (2007); 
John Jacobi, After Managed Care: Gray Boxes, Tiers and Consumerism, 47 St. Louis U. L. J. 397 (2003). 
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employee contributions that can be used to expenses pay for certain medical services.64 One 
rapidly growing variant, the health savings account (HSA), carries with it important tax benefits 
such as allowing taxpayers to exclude from taxable income funds placed in an HSA, provided 
that it is coupled with a high deductible health plan.65
  Are these products the elixir market advocates have been looking for? Judged against the 
prerequisites for effective health market competition discussed above—alleviating market failure 
and reducing fragmentation—CDHC plans are ill-equipped to counter the deeply embedded 
problems in health care delivery that have frustrated competition in the past.  
Examined through the lens of experience, the competition-improving narrative that 
CDHC proponents have advanced is seriously flawed.66  Many American have had the 
experience of “directing” their own health care, shopping for health care services and insurance 
without assistance from third parties.  The results are certainly not encouraging.  For example, 
uninsured consumers—who encounter the market for health services on a regular basis--face 
enormous difficulties in obtaining care at reasonable costs and are forced to accept onerous 
conditions and terms.67 Individuals forced to negotiate with providers who contract at discounted 
rates with insurers also face rampant price discrimination. As Hall and Schneider characterize the 
market dynamic, “uninsured patients must ‘bargain’ individually with providers who are 
determined to recoup what they bargained away to insurers.68   In addition, some basic 
necessities for effective shopping are missing: prices for health services are not readily available, 
or indeed knowable, ex ante.69 Likewise the experience of those left to buy health insurance in 
the individual market have encountered significant problems in comparing offerings and 
understanding risks associated with co-payment obligations and limitations on coverage.70
64 See Paul Fronstin & Sara R. Collins, The 2nd Annual EBRI/Commonwealth Fund Consumerism in Health Survey 
2006: Early Experience with High-Deductible and Consumer-Driven Plans, EBRI Issue Brief No. 300 (Dec. 2006), 
http://www.ebri.org/publications/ib/index.cfm?fa=ibDisp&content_id=3769. See generally Wendy K. Mariner, Can 
Consumer-Choice Plans Satisfy Patients? Problems with Theory and Practice in Health Insurance Contracts, 69 
BROOK. L. REV. 485 (2004) (describing consumer-driven plans and arguing that they effectively ask patients to 
ration their own care) [hereinafter Can Consumer-Choice Plans Satisfy Patients?]. See also Gary Claxton et al., 
Health Benefits in 2006: Premium Increases Moderate, Enrollment in Consumer-Directed Health Plans Remains 
Modest, 25 HEALTH AFF. Web Exclusive W476 (Sept. 26, 2006). 
65 See  Revenue Ruling 2002-41, 2002-28 I.R.B. 75 (employer’s contribution to HSA is not taxable if funds are used 
to pay certain medical expenses). See also, and Melinda Beeuwkes Buntin et al., Consumer-Directed Health Care: 
Early Evidence About Effects on Cost and Quality, HEALTH AFF. Web Exclusive w516, w518 (Oct. 24, 2006); 
Timothy S. Jost & Mark A. Hall, The Role of State Regulation in Consumer-Driven Health Care, 31 AM. J. L. & 
MED 395 (2005). 
66 See Jost, supra note xx;  
67 See Mark A. Hall and Carl E. Schneider, Patients as Consumers: Courts, Contracts, and the New Medical 
Marketplace, 106 Mich. L. Rev. 643, 645 (2008) (analyzing structure and outcome of  health care markets for 
uninsured consumers and concluding,  “The market for uninsured medical services is a calamity”). 
68 See Hall & Schneider supra note xx at 644(“Insurers aggressively negotiate rates for plan members; uninsured 
patients must "bargain" individually with providers who are determined to recoup what they bargained away to 
insurers”).
69 See Paul B. Ginsburg, Shopping for Price in Medical Care, Health Affairs Web Exclusive w608 (Feb. 6, 2007).  
Individuals forced to negotiate prices with providers who contract at discounts with insurers face rampant price 
discrimination. 
70 See Johnson, et al., Framing Probability Distortions, and Insurance Decisions, 7 J. Risk & Uncertainty 35 (1993); 
Judith H. Hibbard et al., Is the Informed-Choice Policy Approach Appropriate for Medicare Beneficiaries?  20 
Health Affs. 199 (May/June 2001). 
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Stepping back to look at the design of consumer driven plans, CDHC does little to 
counteract market failures other than moral hazard.  Problems of agency, information deficits, 
and monopoly power in provider markets are left unchecked, and perhaps worsened, under a 
disintermediated insurance market.71 Advocates of consumer directed solutions rely on consumer 
bargaining to direct marketplace pressures that would encourage providers to assemble into cost 
efficient delivery organizations.  Left unaddressed are persistent, well documented problems of 
obtaining and interpreting information to make informed choices, along with a host of issues 
associated with misaligned incentives associated with provider agency.72 Under these doubtful 
conditions, it is highly improbable that a market lacking effective intermediaries will transmit 
signals that will drive providers to reorganize into more efficient delivery systems.  
Will the new tools associated with CDHC plans counter fragmentation?  Consider two 
contractual measures that rely on market incentives.  One widely employed demand side 
incentive is “tiering.” Designed to incentivize consumers to make value-focused choices,  these 
provisions offers reduced cost sharing to beneficiaries who choose selected providers. Providers 
are classified in tiers, typically based on financial factors,  such as fees and utilization patterns. 
Consumers are thus provided a signal as to cost of their care (the differentials in cost sharing 
obligation) and may incorporate that factor in choosing among providers.  A related strategy that 
operates on the supply side, “pay for performance,” rewards providers with higher 
reimbursement if they achieve specified cost and quality goals.  Both of these approaches are 
even more vulnerable to the problems of market failure and fragmentation than the managed care 
methods that preceded them. Autonomous consumers face intractable problems of assembling 
accurate comparative information to make comparison among tiers and will still be subject to the 
compelling influence of their physician agents who recommend treatments and suggest referrals.  
With much of the most costly care ordered by physicians but provided by others and many 
conditions requiring multiple care givers, it is often be impossible to accurately target rewards 
(or penalties based on performance) in the absence of integrated systems.73  Casting further 
doubt on the efficacy of these tools is the fact that the payment system rewards some services 
more than others, making it hard to induce even integrated practices to reduce lucrative services 
if others are not more generously rewarded.  And where payors represent a small fraction of 
providers’ income, practice style changes that benefit other payers may not be fully 
compensated.74
Finally, even if these cost containment strategies are widely adopted, they may ultimately 
prove insufficient given the design of CDHC plans.  The incentives of consumer directed plans 
are most likely to be effective with regard to routine care; for high cost services, especially those 
occurring under emergent circumstances, financial incentives will have less impact, and in any 
event, CDHC plans offer full catastrophic coverage.   Further, fee for service reimbursement, 
71 See Bryan E. Dowd,  Coordinated Agency Versus Autonomous Consumers in Health Care Markets, 24 Health 
Aff. 1501 (Nov/Dec 2006). 
72 See Jost supra note xx at yy. 
73 See Michael F. Cannon, Pay-For-Perfomance: Is Medicare a Good Candidate? 7  Yale J. Health Pol. L.&  Ethics 
1 (2007); James C. Robinson, Managed Consumerism in Health Care, 24 Health Aff. 1478 (Nov/Dec 2005). 
74 For an instructive example of the difficulties of constructing payment systems that reward high performing 
providers, see Hoangmai H. Pham et al, Redesigning Care Delivery in Response to a High-Performance Network: 
The Virginia Mason Medical Center, Health Affairs Web Exclusive (July 10, 2007). 
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which is employed in CDHC plans, focuses on episodes of care rather than treating chronic 
conditions or encouraging prevention, and thus operates at cross purposes with the cost 
containment strategies. In any event none seem to provide sufficiently strong incentives to de-
fragment health care delivery. More fundamentally, the vision of the competitive market 
constructed by CDHC tends to undermine risk pooling and shift financial burdens from the 
healthy to the sick and from the privileged to underprivileged.75  Ultimately, the “logic” of the 
CDHC market, which seems inexorable to proponents, may not withstand political scrutiny, and 
a “CDHC backlash” seems likely to follow. 
Conclusion 
According to of one of antitrust’s cherished just-so stories, competition drives suppliers 
to form firms or joint ventures and to adopt organizational forms that enable them to provide 
their services efficiently.  Whatever the general validity of that account,  most would agree that 
in health care, market failure complicates things enormously.  Managed care seemed capable of 
helping to overcome those difficulties, and competition policy sought, sometimes quite 
explicitly, to aid that enterprise. For a variety of reasons antitrust came up short and managed 
care fell into disfavor.  The lesson for policymakers and law enforcers is that the success of a 
competitive strategy in health care is highly contingent.  Supportive measures in law and 
financing are required to create an infrastructure that counters market failure and incentivizes the 
private sector to glue together its fragmented elements. 
75 See Robinson supra note xx at 1483.  
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